A trust contest is a lawsuit to set aside a New York trust, or an amendment to it, on the ground that the person who created it lacked capacity, was unduly influenced, was defrauded, or did not follow the execution rules in the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law. Albert Goodwin represents both sides of these cases: trustees and beneficiaries who want the trust upheld, and disinherited family members who want it set aside. This page explains the grounds for contesting a trust in New York, who has standing, which court hears the case, how long you have to bring it, and the procedural tools a trustee uses to defend the instrument. It goes deeper on the defense side, because that is where most published guidance is thin.
If you are defending a trust or considering a challenge to one, call 212-233-1233 or email [email protected].
Trust contests and will contests rest on the same substantive grounds. The procedure is different, and the difference shapes the case. A will is offered for probate under SCPA Article 14. The proponent asks the Surrogate to admit it, distributees receive citation, and an objectant may examine the attesting witnesses and the drafting attorney under SCPA 1404 before deciding whether to file objections. A trust does not go through that process. A revocable (living) trust funded during the settlor's lifetime passes property without any court filing. The person challenging it must start a proceeding, and the trustee responds as a defendant or respondent rather than as a petitioner seeking approval.
The vocabulary also differs. The settlor (or grantor) creates the trust. The trustee administers it. The beneficiaries take under it. The objectant seeks to invalidate it. There are no SCPA 1404 examinations in a trust contest; an objectant must use ordinary disclosure under CPLR Article 31 to obtain the drafting file and medical records. Where the settlor also signed a pour-over will under EPTL 3-3.7 leaving the probate estate to the trust, the will contest and the trust contest are often litigated together, because the same facts about capacity and influence control both instruments.
This page is limited to the validity of the trust itself. If the trust is valid and the dispute is about what the trustee has done with it, see breach of trust and breach of fiduciary duty. If the dispute is about a will, see contesting or defending a will.
Both courts can hear a challenge to a lifetime trust. The Supreme Court has general original jurisdiction under Article VI, section 7 of the New York Constitution. The Surrogate's Court has jurisdiction over lifetime trusts under SCPA 207, which reaches a trust that has assets in New York, a settlor who was a New York domiciliary when the proceeding began, or a trustee acting in New York. SCPA 1509 allows a trustee or any person interested in a lifetime trust to petition the Surrogate's Court for relief, and gives the Surrogate the same powers over lifetime trusts as over testamentary trusts.
The choice of forum is a strategic decision. Points to weigh:
A trustee who learns that a challenge is coming can sometimes choose the forum first by petitioning under SCPA 1509 for a decree upholding the trust, for judicial settlement of an account, or for construction of a disputed provision. Filing first forces the objectant to litigate in the court the trustee selected.
Not everyone who is unhappy with a trust may challenge it. An objectant must have standing: a financial interest that would improve if the trust were set aside. This usually means a person who would take more under a prior version of the trust, under the settlor's will, or under the laws of intestacy in EPTL 4-1.1 if the challenged instrument failed. A child who was left out, or a beneficiary whose share was cut by a later amendment, generally has standing. A friend or distant relative who takes nothing under any scenario does not.
Testing standing is the first defensive step. If the objectant gains nothing even when the contested trust or amendment is invalidated, the defense moves to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(3) before answering. Where there are several successive instruments and each one excludes the objectant, the objectant must plead and prove grounds against each instrument back to one under which they would benefit. An objectant who can only attack the most recent amendment, and who is also excluded under the prior version, has no case.
For the objectant, these are the recognized grounds. For the trustee, these are the only things the objectant is allowed to prove, and the defense is built around holding the objectant to them.
Objectants often plead every ground at once. The defense isolates which grounds are supported by facts and which are recited without proof. Capacity and undue influence are the two that survive to discovery in most cases. Fraud and duress are rarely proven.
There is no single statute of limitations labeled for trust contests. The period depends on the theory:
When the period starts to run is often the main fight. Objectants argue it runs from the settlor's death, when they first learned the terms. Trustees argue it runs from execution, or from the date the objectant received notice of the trust. A beneficiary who received an accounting or a copy of the instrument years earlier is in a weak position to claim ignorance. For trustees, this is one reason to give beneficiaries written notice and a copy of the trust promptly after the settlor's death. See beneficiaries' rights to trust information for what beneficiaries can demand.
A will, by contrast, must be contested in the probate proceeding itself. Once a decree admitting a will to probate is final, the remedy is a motion to vacate the decree under SCPA 209(10) and CPLR 5015, which is far harder than filing objections on time.
New York law presumes that a person who signs a will or trust had the capacity to do so. The objectant bears the burden of proving otherwise. For wills, the standard is settled by Matter of Kumstar, 66 N.Y.2d 691 (1985): the testator must understand (1) the nature and consequences of signing the instrument, (2) the nature and extent of their property, and (3) the natural objects of their bounty. This is a modest standard. A person can be old, ill, forgetful, or in cognitive decline and still meet it.
For lifetime trusts, the standard is less settled, and a trustee should expect the objectant to argue for a higher one. Creating a lifetime trust is a present transfer of property and, in form, a contract between settlor and trustee. Some New York courts have therefore applied the contractual capacity standard, drawn from cases such as Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Board, 25 N.Y.2d 196 (1969), which asks whether the person was able to understand the nature and consequences of the transaction and to act rationally in relation to it. Other courts have applied the testamentary standard, reasoning that a revocable trust functions as a will substitute and should not be easier to attack than a will. The Court of Appeals has not definitively resolved the question. In practice the difference is narrow for a fully revocable trust that simply names who takes at death, and wider for an irrevocable trust that gives up control of assets during life.
The defense of a capacity claim develops along one of three lines:
Undue influence is hard to prove. The objectant must show influence amounting to coercion that destroyed the settlor's free agency. Advice, persuasion, affection, and even persistent nagging are not enough. Under Matter of Walther, 6 N.Y.2d 49 (1959), and Matter of Collins, 124 A.D.2d 48 (4th Dep't 1987), the objectant must ordinarily show motive, opportunity, and the actual exercise of undue influence. Because it is rarely done in front of witnesses, the proof is almost always circumstantial.
The central defensive issue is the confidential relationship. Where a beneficiary held a position of trust and confidence with the settlor and was involved in procuring the instrument, New York courts may draw an inference of undue influence that the proponent must explain. Be precise about what this does. The inference requires the proponent to come forward with an explanation. It does not shift the ultimate burden of proof, which stays with the objectant. A family relationship such as spouse or child does not, by itself, create a confidential relationship. The classic case is the beneficiary who was also the settlor's attorney, drafting the instrument in their own favor; Matter of Putnam, 257 N.Y. 140 (1931), requires an explanation in that setting.
Factors that matter in practice:
CPLR 4519, the Dead Man's Statute, bars an interested witness from testifying about personal transactions or communications with the deceased settlor when that testimony is offered against the settlor's representative or successor in interest. Undue influence and fraud claims so often rest on what the objectant says the settlor told them. CPLR 4519 strips out much of that testimony. Combined with the hearsay rule, this is a recurring reason that capacity and influence contests fail on summary judgment. The bar is waivable, so the trustee's own lawyer must not open the door by questioning the objectant about those conversations at deposition without a plan.
The attorney who drafted and supervised execution of the trust is usually the most important witness for either side. That attorney can testify to the settlor's responsiveness, independent statement of intent, understanding of the terms, and who was in the room. Intake notes, drafts showing the settlor's own changes, and an execution memorandum can convert an arguable capacity question into a defensible one.
The attorney-client privilege does not block this testimony. CPLR 4503(b) requires an attorney, in an action involving the validity of a will or, after the grantor's death, a revocable trust, to disclose information about the preparation, execution, or revocation of the instrument. The one limit is that the court may exclude communications that would tend to disgrace the memory of the decedent. A trustee defending a trust should obtain the drafting attorney's complete file early, before the objectant frames the narrative through a deposition. An objectant should demand it in the first discovery request.
Many trusts contain a clause providing that a beneficiary who challenges the instrument forfeits their share. EPTL 3-3.5 governs these clauses in wills and makes them enforceable, subject to safe harbors: a beneficiary may, without forfeiture, contest on the ground that the will is a forgery or was revoked by a later will if there is probable cause, object to jurisdiction, demand SCPA 1404 examinations, and seek construction of the instrument. No statute addresses in terrorem clauses in lifetime trusts. New York courts have generally enforced them by analogy to EPTL 3-3.5, and the safe harbors are commonly argued to apply as well.
For a trustee, the clause is a deterrent. A beneficiary who stands to inherit a meaningful share faces a choice between keeping it and gambling it on a contest. For an objectant, the clause requires an honest assessment of the odds before filing. It has no effect on a person who takes nothing under the trust, because they have nothing to forfeit. The clause should be raised in the trustee's answer as a defense and counterclaim; it is not self-executing.
A trustee has a duty to defend the trust against an unjustified attack. EPTL 11-1.1 authorizes a fiduciary to retain counsel and pay reasonable administration expenses, and counsel fees incurred in good faith to defend the trust's validity are ordinarily chargeable to the trust, subject to court review for reasonableness. Two cautions apply. First, a trustee who is also the principal beneficiary accused of undue influence is defending their own inheritance, and a court may require that trustee to bear some or all of the fees personally, or defer the question until the outcome is known. Second, if the trust is set aside, fees paid from trust assets may have to be restored. The objectant generally pays their own fees unless a statute or the instrument provides otherwise. Fee questions are typically resolved in an accounting; see our page on trust and estate accountings.
The fact patterns below recur in our practice. They are composites, not case results, and no outcome is implied.
Yes. Any trust, revocable or irrevocable, may be set aside for lack of capacity, undue influence, fraud, duress, or failure to meet the execution requirements of EPTL 7-1.17. The objectant must have standing and must bring the claim within the applicable limitations period.
Yes. Most trust contests are brought after the settlor's death, when the terms become known and the trust becomes irrevocable. The claim is usually governed by the six-year period in CPLR 213(1), or by CPLR 213(8) for fraud, and the trustee may argue the period began earlier than the objectant claims.
Generally six years under CPLR 213(1) for capacity, undue influence, and duress, and six years from the fraud or two years from discovery under CPLR 213(8) for fraud. The start date is often disputed, and laches may bar a claim brought within the period if the delay prejudiced the trustee.
The objectant. New York presumes the settlor had capacity and signed freely. A confidential relationship between the settlor and a beneficiary who procured the trust may create an inference the trustee must explain, but the ultimate burden stays with the objectant.
No. Capacity is measured at the moment of signing. A settlor with a dementia diagnosis may have had a lucid interval when the trust was executed. Contemporaneous medical records and the drafting attorney's testimony usually decide the question.
Either. The Surrogate's Court has jurisdiction over lifetime trusts under SCPA 207 and 1509; the Supreme Court has general jurisdiction. Where a related estate is already in Surrogate's Court, the trust contest usually goes there, and the Supreme Court may transfer a case under CPLR 325(e).
Generally yes. EPTL 3-3.5 governs wills, and New York courts have enforced similar clauses in lifetime trusts by analogy, with similar safe harbors. The clause only deters a beneficiary who has something to lose; a person who takes nothing under the trust is unaffected.
Reasonable fees for a good-faith defense of the trust's validity are ordinarily paid from the trust, subject to court review. A trustee who is also the beneficiary accused of undue influence may be required to bear fees personally, and fees may have to be returned if the trust is set aside.
Statutory text cited on this page is available from the New York State Senate: EPTL 7-1.17, SCPA 1509, and CPLR 4519.
This page was prepared by the office of Albert Goodwin, Esq., an attorney admitted to practice in New York who represents trustees, beneficiaries, and objectants in contested trust and estate matters in the Surrogate's Courts and Supreme Courts of New York City and the surrounding counties. To discuss a trust contest, call 212-233-1233 or email [email protected].
This article is general information about New York law and is not legal advice. The outcome of any trust contest depends on its facts. No result is promised or guaranteed.