Reviewed by Albert Goodwin, Esq., Law Offices of Albert Goodwin, New York estate and trust litigation. Last reviewed 2025. This page is general information about New York law and is not legal advice for your situation.
The answer depends on who the buyer is. If the trustee sold trust property to himself, to his spouse, or to a company he owns or controls, New York treats the sale as self-dealing and the beneficiaries can have it set aside without proving that the price was too low. If the trustee sold to an adult child, a sibling, a parent or another relative who is financially independent of him, the sale is not automatically void. The trustee’s conflict of interest shifts the burden to him to prove the sale was disclosed, fair, and made at market value, and a beneficiary who proves a loss can obtain rescission or a surcharge and can petition to remove the trustee.
This page covers both situations. It explains the two New York standards, what a beneficiary has to prove under each, how the Surrogate’s Court measures the surcharge, and what defenses a trustee has. For the related question of a beneficiary (rather than a relative of the trustee) buying from the trust, see our page on a beneficiary buying property from a trust.
New York fiduciary law has one rule for a trustee who deals with himself and a different rule for a trustee who deals with someone close to him. The older pages on this subject sometimes blur the two. They are distinct, and the distinction decides whether the beneficiary has to prove a loss.
A trustee owes the beneficiaries undivided loyalty. The Court of Appeals described the duty in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458 (1928), as “not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.” When a fiduciary buys from the trust he administers, the court applies what is often called the no-further-inquiry rule: it does not ask whether the price was fair. In Munson v. Syracuse, Geneva & Corning R.R. Co., 103 N.Y. 58 (1886), the court explained that it “does not stop to inquire whether the contract or transaction was fair or unfair,” because the value of the rule lies in its inflexibility.
Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 73 N.Y.2d 461 (1989), applied that rule to a modern estate. Saul Birnbaum was a co-executor of his father’s estate, which held an interest in a shopping center development. He caused the estate’s share of the project to pay fees for development and management work to himself and his own companies, without the consent of his co-fiduciaries. The Court of Appeals ordered the fees returned. It did not matter that the work had been done or that the charges might have been reasonable. The court called the duty of loyalty a “sensitive and inflexible rule of fidelity” that bars blatant self-dealing and requires avoidance of situations in which a fiduciary’s personal interest possibly conflicts with the interest of those owed a fiduciary duty.
Under this standard the following buyers are treated as the trustee himself:
The court looks at substance. A sale to a friend who resells to the trustee’s daughter a month later, or a sale to an LLC the daughter nominally owns while the trustee runs it, is examined as a sale to the trustee.
Under this standard the beneficiary proves three things: that the seller was the trustee acting for the trust, that the transfer occurred, and that the buyer was the trustee or one of the persons listed above. The sale is then voidable at the election of the beneficiaries. The trustee’s good faith, the adequacy of the price, and the absence of loss are not defenses, although they may affect the size of a money judgment if the beneficiaries choose money instead of rescission.
A sale to the trustee’s adult child, sibling or parent who paid with her own money and who holds the property for herself is not a sale to the trustee. New York does not void such a sale on the relationship alone. In Matter of Marsh, 179 A.D.2d 578 (1st Dep’t 1992), the Appellate Division held that a potential conflict of interest between a fiduciary and an interested party does not by itself warrant denying letters to, or removing, the fiduciary; actual misconduct, not a conflict of interest, is what justifies removal.
The relationship still matters. It changes who has to prove what. In Matter of Wallens, 9 N.Y.3d 117 (2007), a father served as trustee of a trust created for his daughter under a divorce settlement. He used trust money to pay her private school and college costs, expenses he was personally obligated to pay under the settlement. The Court of Appeals held that the trustee had placed himself in a position of conflict and could not simply assert that the beneficiary had received a benefit; the question of whether his use of trust funds was proper required a hearing at which the trustee had to justify the expenditures. The court repeated that a trustee is held to a standard stricter than the morals of the marketplace.
Applied to a sale, this means the court treats the trustee as having a conflict and requires him to show:
If the trustee cannot make that showing and the beneficiary proves the trust received less than the property was worth, the sale was a waste of trust assets. The beneficiary can recover the loss and can seek removal under SCPA 711.
Under EPTL 11-1.1(b)(5)(B), a fiduciary may sell real property that is not specifically devised at public or private sale, on the terms that in the fiduciary’s opinion will be most advantageous to the persons interested, unless the governing instrument limits that power. Beneficiary consent is not required for an ordinary sale. The statutory power does not authorize a below-market sale to anyone, and a discount to a relative is a gift of trust property that the trustee has no power to make.
If the trust instrument itself forbids the sale, forbids sales to family members, or requires consent that was not obtained, EPTL 7-2.4 provides that an act of the trustee in contravention of an express trust is void. The beneficiaries may still elect to affirm the sale and pursue the trustee for money if that serves them better.
A beneficiary of a New York trust is entitled to information about the trust’s administration. See our page on beneficiaries’ rights to trust information. Before filing anything, assemble the following:
The Surrogate’s Court has jurisdiction over testamentary trusts and, under SCPA 207, over lifetime trusts. A beneficiary may also sue in Supreme Court for breach of fiduciary duty and a constructive trust. Most of these disputes are resolved in the Surrogate’s Court through the steps below.
Under SCPA 2205, a beneficiary may petition to compel the trustee to file a formal account. Once the account is filed, SCPA 2211(2) permits the objectant to examine the trustee under oath, and to obtain the trustee’s books and records, before objections are due. The beneficiary then files objections to the account, identifying the sale, the price received, and the value the trust should have received. The trustee carries the burden of proving that the account is complete and that the transactions in it were proper. Disputed objections are tried before the Surrogate. Our accounting attorneys page covers the accounting process in more detail.
SCPA 711 lists the grounds for removal, including that the trustee has wasted or improperly applied the assets of the trust, or is unfit for the office by reason of dishonesty or improvidence. Removal under 711 requires process and, where facts are disputed, a hearing; in Matter of Duke, 87 N.Y.2d 465 (1996), the Court of Appeals reversed a removal ordered without a hearing on contested facts. SCPA 719 permits removal without process in specific listed situations, for example under 719(7) where the trustee has mingled trust funds with his own, which often follows a family sale when the proceeds land in the trustee’s personal account. The court may suspend the trustee and appoint a temporary fiduciary while the removal petition is pending. See can you remove a trustee and our trustee removal attorney page.
SCPA 2103 allows a fiduciary to petition for the discovery of property that belongs to the estate or trust and is held by another person. The petition is brought by a fiduciary, so a beneficiary ordinarily first obtains the appointment of a successor or temporary trustee, who then brings the 2103 proceeding against the relative who holds the deed. If the relative claims to own the property, SCPA 2104 permits the court to try title and direct turnover. See our page on discovery and turnover proceedings.
| Remedy | What it does | When available |
|---|---|---|
| Rescission | Sets aside the deed and returns the property to the trust; the buyer gets back the price paid, with adjustments. | Sales to the trustee or his alter ego, at the beneficiaries’ election. Sales to an independent relative where unfairness is shown and the relative still holds title. |
| Surcharge for lost value | Orders the trustee to pay the trust, from his own funds, the difference between the price received and fair market value at the date of sale, with interest. | Any sale where the beneficiary proves the trust received less than market value because of the trustee’s breach. The standard remedy against an independent-relative sale. |
| Appreciation damages or disgorgement | Measures the loss by the property’s value at the time of the decree, or by the profit the buyer realized on resale, rather than by the value at the date of sale. | Self-dealing and deliberate conflict, following Matter of Rothko; not available for ordinary negligence under Matter of Janes. |
| Constructive trust and tracing | Imposes a trust on the property, its resale proceeds, or assets bought with those proceeds, in the hands of anyone who took with notice. | Where the relative has resold, mortgaged or exchanged the property. A bona fide purchaser for value without notice is protected under Real Property Law § 266. |
| Forfeiture of commissions | Denies the trustee the statutory commissions under SCPA 2309 for the period of the misconduct. | In the court’s discretion on a finding of breach; routinely sought with a surcharge. |
| Removal | Ends the trustee’s authority and installs a successor. | SCPA 711 on proof of waste, improper application of assets, or unfitness; SCPA 719 in the listed circumstances. |
| Legal fees | Denies the trustee reimbursement from the trust for the cost of defending his own breach; in some cases charges the beneficiary’s fees to the trustee personally. | Fees are fixed by the court under SCPA 2110. Denial of reimbursement is common after a finding of breach. Shifting the beneficiary’s fees to the trustee is the exception and depends on the court’s findings about the trustee’s conduct. |
Our page on fiduciary surcharge explains how the surcharge is pleaded and proved.
The measure of damages depends on which standard applies. Two Court of Appeals decisions set the boundaries.
Matter of Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d 305 (1977), involved the estate of the painter Mark Rothko. Two of the three executors had ties to the Marlborough galleries: one was an officer and director of Marlborough, and the other was an artist under contract with it. Within weeks of their appointment the executors sold and consigned 798 paintings to Marlborough on terms the Surrogate found grossly unfavorable. The Court of Appeals affirmed a surcharge measured by the appreciated value of the paintings at the time of the decree, not their value when sold. Because the conflicted executors had engaged in self-dealing rather than mere negligence, the estate was entitled to be put in the position it would have occupied had the paintings been kept. The third executor, who had no conflict, was surcharged for failing to stop the others.
Matter of Janes, 90 N.Y.2d 41 (1997), marks the other boundary. An executor imprudently retained a concentrated position in Kodak stock while it fell in value. The Court of Appeals held that for a negligent breach the surcharge is the value lost measured as of the date the stock should have been sold, plus interest, and rejected a larger award based on what the proceeds would have earned if reinvested. The court distinguished Rothko on the ground that Rothko involved self-dealing. Janes also confirmed that the rate of prejudgment interest on a surcharge is in the Surrogate’s discretion.
A trust holds a two-family house in Brooklyn. The trustee sells it to his daughter for $700,000 without listing it. The beneficiary obtains an appraisal showing fair market value on the sale date was $900,000.
A trustee accused of selling to a relative has a limited set of defenses. Each depends on documents created before or at the time of the sale.
| Defense | What must be shown |
|---|---|
| Instrument authorization | The trust instrument expressly permits sales to the trustee or to family members. General powers of sale are not enough. Even specific authorization does not excuse a below-market price or concealment, because the trustee must still act in good faith. |
| Informed consent or release | Every affected beneficiary, with capacity, consented in writing after full disclosure of the buyer’s identity, the price, and the property’s value. Under Flaum v. Birnbaum, 120 A.D.2d 183 (4th Dep’t 1986), a consented-to self-dealing transaction remains voidable if the trustee failed to disclose material facts he knew or should have known, used his position to induce the consent, or the transaction was not fair and reasonable in all respects. |
| Advance court approval | The trustee petitioned under SCPA 2107 for advice and direction before closing, disclosed the relationship and the valuation to all interested parties, and the court approved the sale. Approval obtained on incomplete disclosure does not bind the beneficiaries. |
| Judicially settled account | The sale was disclosed in a formal account, the objecting beneficiary was cited and had the chance to object, and the court entered a decree settling the account. The decree is binding on the parties as to the transactions disclosed. It can be reopened for fraud or newly discovered evidence under CPLR 5015, and it does not bind a beneficiary who was never cited. |
| Statute of limitations | A claim for equitable relief against a trustee carries a six-year period under CPLR 213(1); a claim for money only carries three years under CPLR 214(4). Under Matter of Barabash, 31 N.Y.2d 76 (1972), the period does not begin to run against a trustee until he openly repudiates the trust or his account is judicially settled, so a concealed sale rarely becomes time-barred while the trustee remains in office. |
| Laches | The beneficiary knew of the sale and the relationship, delayed unreasonably, and the delay prejudiced the trustee or the buyer. |
| No loss (independent-relative sales only) | The price matched fair market value and the terms matched the market, proved by a contemporaneous appraisal, a public listing, or competing bids. This defense is not available where the buyer was the trustee or his alter ego. |
The safest course is not to sell trust property to a family member. If a relative wants the property, obtain an independent appraisal, list the property publicly with a broker, let the relative bid alongside other buyers, and keep the listing records and every offer. Tell the beneficiaries in writing who the buyer is before signing a contract, and obtain written consents from adult beneficiaries after they have seen the appraisal. Where a beneficiary is a minor, incapacitated, or unwilling to consent, petition the Surrogate’s Court under SCPA 2107 for approval before closing. A trustee whose relative’s interest creates a continuing conflict should consider resigning in favor of an independent successor before the sale.
If you are a beneficiary who has learned that the trustee sold trust real estate to a child, spouse, sibling or related company, or a trustee who is being accused of self-dealing over a sale you believe was at market, we can review the deed, the closing documents and the trust instrument and tell you which standard applies and what the likely remedy is. For the broader rules on fiduciary misconduct, see our pages on breach of fiduciary duty and breach of trust. Call the Law Offices of Albert Goodwin at 212-233-1233 or write to [email protected].